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In 2009 it had the 
second-best stock 
market in the world.
In 2008 Russia had 
the worst stock 
market in the world.
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7• Late Brezhnev era, Gorbachev, 
Yeltsin, 1981-1999
1) 18 years of shrinking rents.
2) Loss of control of rents.
• Putin era, 2000-
1) New rent explosion.
2) Control of rents regained.
8How Did Putin Do It?
• Did NOT re-nationalize Russian economy.
• Putin is not a “crypto-Soviet” leader.
• He knows that market economy is 
superior.
• Needs private owners, market economy, 
to make Russia competitive.
• Dilemma: How to harness the private 
owners and make them work for you.
9• Putin inherits “Oligarchic Capitalism” from 
Yeltsin.
• 1996 - “Loans for Shares” mean oligarchs 
rule Russia.
• 1996 - Putin arrives in Moscow, a virtual 
nobody.
• 1997-98 - oligarchs on the brink of mutual 
destruction.
• 1997-98 - Putin acquires means to save the 
oligarchs ... and subject them to his 
System.
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The Oligarchs’ Problem
• The weapon the oligarchs were stockpiling to use 
against each other was financial information, 
financial intelligence.
• This was the potentially most destructive weapon.
• It was “mutually assured destruction” - not 
between just two or three, but an entire group. 
And they had already started the war (the 
“Bankers’ War”).
• Ultimate brinksmanship, “Cuban Missile Crisis.”
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The stratum of truly leading entrepreneurs in 
Russia is “very thin and very precious . . . they 
are the bearers of capital, of intellect, of 
technologies.” 
“The oil men are no less important than the oil; 
the state has to make the most of them both.” 
-- Putin aide Vladislav Surkov, summer 2000
Putin’s Attitude Toward Oligarchs
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A Deal of Mutual Advantage
• For the oligarchs, Putin is their only hope for 
continued survival and wealth.  
• For Putin, the oligarchs represent the 
mechanism through he can ensure maximum 
creation of rent and its effective distribution.
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Details of the Deal
• Keep property
• Manage with virtually no 
interference
• Grow the companies 
• Get personally richer
• Be protected against 
expropriation – or worse!
• Pay taxes – in cash, in 
full
– Don’t try to change tax 
laws
– Don’t collude with 
governors
• Share wealth informally
– “Excess costs” (keep 
addicts happy)
– Philanthropy
• Let Putin make strategic 
decisions (esp. foreign)
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Putin’s System
• This is real meaning of “Kremlin, Inc.” or 
“Russia, Inc.”
– A tiny number of individuals – including private 
owners – who run entire economy
– They are in turn controlled [monitored] by a nine-
man board of directors: Putin + 2 first deputy prime 
ministers + six deputy prime ministers.
• Medvedev?
– Not particularly important?
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“The Don”
“The Underboss” “The Consigliere”
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The Key to Putin’s System
• In contrast to a classic mafia-style “protection 
racket” (extortion), Putin offered something the 
oligarchs desperately needed: protection against 
each other!
• They were about to mutually self-destruct. He 
gave them a way out.
• That is why it has been so stable.
• (Lucky Luciano’s “National Commission”)
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• Priority 1: sovereignty
• Priority 2: stability
For each:
• Step 1: regain
• Step 2: secure and protect
• Step 3: enhance
Next steps: Meet priorities for 
rent use
18
Sovereignty: Soviet Lesson for 
Today’s Russia
• USSR did not collapse because defeated 
militarily
• Collapsed because lost political sovereignty
• Lost political sovereignty when lost financial 
sovereignty
• Lesson: Restore financial sovereignty!
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Achieving Sovereignty
• January 2000
– $8.5 billion in foreign exchange reserves
– $133 government external debt
• Mid-2008
– $600 billion in forex reserves
– Debt is around $30 billion
• Key date: January 2005
– Paid off IMF debt 3.5 years ahead of schedule
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Simplest indicator of sovereignty -
- therefore independence of 
foreign policy -- is size of foreign 
exchange reserves
• Although drawn down in crisis, Russia’s are 
still the third largest in the world
• (Only China and Japan bigger)
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Stability: Sharing the Rent
• Total value of oil and gas shared in society 
in different ways
• Main distinction: formal and informal rent-
sharing
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Rent Sharing
after-tax profit
formal taxes pre-tax profit 
Total Rent informal taxes
price subsidies
excess 
extraction 
cost 
reported 
cost of 
production 
natural extraction cost
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Khodorkovsky
• Founding member of Oligarchs’ Club
• Initially, Poster Boy for Putin’s Deal 
• Later decides there is better way:
– Transparency
– Formality
• Khodorkovsky’s alternative model unacceptable
• Arrested fall 2003
– Now in GULAG
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For the rest, a pretty good deal:
Consider Forbes “Billionaires List”
2000:  4 Russians,
total wealth $12 billion
2008: 87 Russians,
total wealth $470 billion
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Most Important Issue for Russia:
What Will Future Rents Be?
• Rent = Price x Quantity
• Russia does not control world price
• No one knows the future oil price
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Russia does control quantity, but 
there are issues:
• Western Siberia - “easy oil” - “legacy oil”
• Eastern Siberia, Far East, Arctic completely 
different
• No infrastructure
• Much colder, more remote (“Siberian Curse” 
thesis)
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Running out of oil?
“Yes” and “No”
• YES: Definitely running out of “legacy oil”
• NO: Actual amount of oil in East could be 
huge. No one yet knows.
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But if believe main price forecasts, 
not a bad future for Russia
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Implications for international behavior:
Bad news for those who think economic 
crisis will make Russia docile again (“Good 
Russia” of Yeltsin era) 
• Fundamental economic health is NOT a 
prerequisite for Russia’s “assertiveness” or 
even “aggressiveness.”
• Only need political sovereignty
• Putin achieved that
• He will not sacrifice sovereignty
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